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(57) ABSTRACT 
Various embodiments of the invention are detection systems 
and methods for detecting call provenance based on call 
audio. An exemplary embodiment of the detection system 
can comprise a characterization unit, a labeling unit, and an 
identification unit. The characterization unit can extract 
various characteristics of networks through which a call 
traversed, based on call audio. The labeling unit can be 
trained on prior call data and can identify one or more 
codecs used to encode the call, based on the call audio. The 
identification unit can utilize the characteristics of traversed 
networks and the identified codecs, and based on this 
information, the identification unit can provide a provenance 
fingerprint for the call. Based on the call provenance fin-
gerprint, the detection system can identify, verify, or provide 
forensic information about a call audio source. 
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SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR DETECTING 
CALL PROVENANCE FROM CALL AUDIO 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
This application is a continuation application claiming 
priority under 35 U.S.C. §120 to U.S. Non-Provisional 
patent application Ser. No. 13/807,837, filed 31 Dec. 2012; 
which is the U.S. National Stage oflnternational Application 
No. PCT/US2011/042410, filed 29 Jun. 2011; which claims 
priority under 35 U.S.C. §119(e) to U.S. Provisional Appli-
cation No. 61/359,586, filed 29 Jun. 2010, the entire contents 
and substance of which are hereby incorporated by reference 
as if fully set forth below. 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
Various embodiments of the invention relate to telecom-
munications call analysis and, more particularly, to systems 
and methods for detecting call provenance, which may be a 
source and path taken by a call, based on audio of the call. 
BACKGROUND 
Telephony networks are exceedingly complex systems. 
While once designed, manufactured, and run by a single 
company, today's telephone networks are an elaborate com-
bination of many different technologies. 
There are three general classes of telephony networks: 
public switched telephone networks (PSTNs), cellular net-
works, and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) networks. 
PSTNs are traditional, circuit-switched telephony systems. 
These networks are generally characterized by lossless con-
nections and high fidelity audio. Components of the cores of 
some PSTNs are being replaced by internet protocol (IP) 
connections, but private links of PSTNs remain tightly 
controlled to ensure near-zero packet loss. Like PSTN 
systems, cellular networks have a circuit-switched core, with 
portions currently being replaced by IP links. While these 
networks can have considerably different technologies 
deployed in their wireless interfaces, the cores of cellular 
networks are extremely similar to PSTN networks. Lastly, 
VoIP networks run on top of IP links and generally share 
paths as other Internet-based traffic. 
2 
personal information, including credit card and PIN details. 
Many of these attacks used VoIP phones to anonymously and 
inexpensively dial a large number of customers while forg-
ing the Caller-IDs of the applicable banks. 
Similarly, fraudsters have used phishing emails that ask a 
bank's customers to dial *67 followed by a phone number 
that is claimed to belong to the bank but in reality belongs 
to a fraudster. After a customer follows these instructions, all 
further phone calls going to the customer phone are for-
10 warded to the fraudster's number. Therefore anytime the 
bank attempts to call the customer, the call instead reaches 
the fraudster, which breaks many of the multi-factor authen-
tication mechanisms currently employed by various banks. 
15 SUMMARY 
For various reasons, including the above, there is a need 
for detection systems and methods to detect all or part of the 
true provenance of a call. It is to such systems and methods 
20 that various embodiments of the invention are directed. 
Various embodiments of the invention are systems and 
methods to detect call provenance based on call audio, thus 
not relying on metadata of a call. Briefly described, an 
exemplary embodiment of a detection system can comprise 
25 a characterization unit, a training unit, and a prediction unit. 
The characterization unit can extract various characteris-
tics of at least a portion of the audio of a call stream, where 
those characteristics may be a product of using a particular 
phone or of traversing particular networks. Such character-
30 istics may therefore act as forensic information about the 
call stream. For example, and not limitation, the character-
ization unit can determine a noise profile for a call audio. 
The characterization unit can also detect packet loss and can 
identify a concealment algorithm used to regenerate lost 
35 packets. Information determined by the characterization unit 
may be indicative of one or more participating phones of a 
call or of various specific networks traversed by the call and 
can thus be used by the detection system to identify, verify, 
or provide forensic information about a participating phone 
40 or all or part of a route of the call. 
For a particular call audio, the training unit can use 
features extracted by the characterization unit and can attach 
specific labels to the call based on prior knowledge about the 
call. On being provided with a set of training calls, along 
45 with the training calls' features and labels, the training unit 
can learn a first model for modeling an association between 
the features and the labels. In an exemplary embodiment the 
labels can be indications of one or more codecs used to 
encode the call audio. In an exemplary embodiment, the 
The current telephony infrastructure allows users to com-
municate using a variety of technologies. Circuit-switched 
landlines continue to provide telephony to the majority of 
homes and businesses. Mobile phones now offer service to 
more than four billion users over cellular networks. VoIP 
allows users to inexpensively communicate with each other 
irrespective of the geographical distances, using mobile 
phones and other computing devices. Each of these tele-
communication networks adopts its own set of standards, 
including underlying transport protocols and codecs used, 55 
yet they seamlessly interact through a variety of conversion 
mechanisms. A call may traverse multiple types of networks, 
taking advantage of the benefits offered by each before 
reaching its final destination. 
50 training unit can then use a multi-label classifier to model the 
association between the features and the multiple codecs. 
The model can be used to predict the codecs (i.e., labels) for 
a new call. The codecs in turn can be used to determine 
which types of networks were traversed by the call. 
In some instances, the set of labels for a call can be a 
unique identifier for a particular phone. In such an instance, 
the training unit 120 can learn a second model that associates 
the features with this unique identifier. Thus, the detection 
system 100 can comprise or access a first model for mapping 
The diversification of telephony infrastructure signifi-
cantly reduces the integrity associated with call metadata, 
such as caller identification, because metadata is either not 
transferred across these networks or is transferred without 
verification. As a result, metadata can be easily manipulated 
60 features to codecs and a second model for mapping features 
to call audio sources. If the audio being analyzed is of the 
calling party, the detection system 100 behaves as an alter-
native to traditional caller identification (also known as 
Caller-ID) or as a caller identification verification tool. 
by hardware or software when passing between networks. 65 
For example, between Jan. 21 and 26 of 2010, customers of 
banks in four states received calls asking them to reveal 
The prediction unit can use the features extracted by the 
characterization unit and the model learnt by the training 
unit to predict labels for new calls. The prediction unit can 
US 9,516,497 B2 
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identify the codecs and the networks traversed by a new call, 
as well as uniquely identifying one or more participating 
phones. In addition, the characteristics of the call, such as 
the noise profile, the packet loss patterns, and the types of 
networks traversed, can be sufficiently different across dif-
ferent calls so as to create a unique provenance signature for 
4 
about a source and path taken by a call audio. Embodiments 
of the invention, however, need not be limited to this 
context. 
a call. Accordingly, the prediction unit can identify the call 
audio source if the provenance signature has been previously 
encountered and corresponds to a known source, or the 
provenance signature can provide important information 10 
about the path of a call's audio, including for example, the 
source or the destination of the call audio. 
The components described hereinafter as making up vari-
ous elements of the invention are intended to be illustrative 
and not restrictive. Many suitable components that can 
perform the same or similar functions as components 
described herein are intended to be embraced within the 
scope of the invention. Such other components not described 
herein can include, but are not limited to, similar or analo-
gous components developed after development of the inven-
tion. 
Various embodiments of the present invention are detec-
tion systems to determine call provenance based on audio These and other objects, features, and advantages of the 
detection system will become more apparent upon reading 
the following specification in conjunction with the accom-
panying drawing figures. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES 
FIG. 1 illustrates a diagram of an exemplary telephone 
call and use of a detection system during or after the call, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present 
invention. 
15 analysis. Referring now to the figures, in which like refer-
ence numerals represent like parts throughout the views, 
various embodiment of the detection system will be 
described in detail. 
FIG. 1 illustrates a diagram of an exemplary telephone 
20 call and use of a detection system 100 during or after the 
call, according to an exemplary embodiment of the present 
invention. As shown in FIG. 1, a call can be a two-way 
communication comprising at least two call audio streams, 
FIG. 2 illustrates a diagram of the detection system, 25 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present 
including a first call audio stream from the caller to the call 
recipient and a second call stream from the call recipient to 
the caller. The detection system 100 can analyze call audio 
invention. 
FIG. 3 illustrates a diagram of an exemplary combination 
of calling networks. 
FIGS. 4A-4B illustrate graphs indicating exemplary 
packet loss in a VoIP network, with a packet loss rate of 
approximately 5%. FIG. 4A illustrates the amplitude of a 
two-second audio signal for a call over a VoIP network, 
while FIG. 4B illustrates the corresponding short-term aver-
age energy (STE) for the same audio signal. 
FIG. 5 illustrates exemplary analysis of the STE of a 
fifteen-second call audio signal, encoded with G.711 and 
transmitted through a network with 5% packet loss, where 
the STE analysis is in accordance with an exemplary 
embodiment of the present invention. 
FIGS. 6A-6B illustrate exemplary packet loss of two VoIP 
networks that use different codecs. The VoIP network cor-
responding to FIG. 6A utilizes iLBC encoded at 30 ms of 
audio per packet, and the VoIP network corresponding to 
FIG. 6B utilizes Speex encoded at 20 ms of audio per packet. 
FIG. 7 illustrates the spectral clarity, the spectral level 
range, and deviation for 20 male and female American 
English speech samples from the Open Speech Repository, 
encoded and decoded using the five different codecs dis-
cussed herein. 
FIG. 8 illustrates how extracted features of an audio signal 
can be utilized to determine call provenance, according to an 
exemplary embodiment of the present invention. 
FIG. 9 illustrates an example of a suitable computing 
device that can be used as or can comprise a portion of the 
detection system, according to an exemplary embodiment of 
the present invention. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
from either call stream. When used to analyze call audio 
directed from the caller to the call recipient at the call 
recipient's end, the detection system 100 can behave as a 
30 caller identification device or as a caller identification veri-
fier. When used to analyze call audio directed from the call 
recipient to the caller at the caller's end, the detection system 
100 can determine if the call is being forwarded. Each call 
stream of a single call can have a different source and 
35 destination, depending on the direction of the call stream. 
Accordingly, the term "source," as used herein, can refer to 
the caller, to a telecommunications device of the call, to the 
call recipient, to a telecommunications device of the call 
recipient. Analogously, the term "path," as used herein, can 
40 refer to a path in either direction between (on one side) the 
caller or the caller's telecommunications device and (on the 
other side) the call recipient or the call recipient's telecom-
munications device. 
Although FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of the detec-
45 tion system 100 being located at the end of each call stream 
of the call, this need not be the case. In an exemplary 
embodiment, an instance of the detection system 100 
requires call audio from only a single one of the call streams 
in order to determine information about provenance related 
50 to that call stream. The detection system 100 can analyze a 
single one of the call streams, without a need to communi-
cate additional information (i.e., other than the call audio) 
between the two sides of the two-way communication. In 
other words, the detection system 100 can be located at one 
55 end of a call, at both ends of the call, or may alternatively 
be located at a remote position, so as to analyze call audio 
during or after the call takes place. 
In today's telephony networks, audio of a call stream may 
pass through multiple different types of networks, and 
60 metadata associated with the call audio may be modified 
between the networks, particularly at network gateways. In 
some cases, the only data related to a call that reliably passes 
between the networks is the call audio itself. The metadata 
To facilitate an understanding of the principles and fea-
tures of the invention, various illustrative embodiments are 
explained below. In particular, the invention is described in 
the context of being a detection system for determining call 65 
provenance based on audio analysis. Call provenance can be 
used to identify, verify, or provide forensic information 
camiot be trusted, as it is modifiable during transmission of 
the call audio. Accordingly, various embodiments of the 
present invention analyze the call audio to determine infor-
mation about a path of the call audio, such as information 
US 9,516,497 B2 
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about the source and the networks traversed. For example, 
and not limitation, a detection system of the present inven-
tion can determine or verify an identity of a call audio 
source, types of one or more networks traversed, a general 
geography of the call audio source, or even an identity of one 
or more specific networks traversed. 
6 
100 can consider the five commonly used narrowband 
codecs that are listed in Table 1, which appears below. 
TABLE 1 
Networks Codec Applications 
PSTN, VoIP G.711 Standard Telephony 
Cellular GSM-FR Cellular Telephony 
VoIP iLBC VoIP with Cable 
FIG. 2 illustrates a diagram of a detection system 100, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present 
invention. As shown in FIG. 2, the detection system 100 can 
be embodied, in whole or in part, in a general or specialized 10 
computing device 900 (see FIG. 9), such as a personal 
computer or a caller identification or verification device. For 
example, and not limitation, one or more aspects of the 
invention can be a computer program product that is embod- 15 
ied in a computer readable medium and is executable by one 
VoIP Speex Xbox ®Live 
VoIP G.729 SkypeOut, Skypeln 
A codec commonly used in PSTNs 310 is G.711, with 
North America and Japan using the mu-law compression 
algorithm and Europe and other regions using A-law. Both 
the mu-law and A-law algorithms ofthis codec generate a 64 
or more processing units of one or more computing devices 
900. 
kbps (20 ms audio frames) constant bit-rate (CBR) stream 
for speech sampled at 8 kHz, which is relatively bandwidth 
intensive when compared to other codecs. 
In cellular networks 310, the GSM full rate (GSM-FR) 
codec was the first digital cellular coding standard and is still 
widely used in cellular networks 310. Unlike G.711, which 
is a waveform coder, GSM-FR uses predictive coding, 
which is more common among modem codecs and allows a 
The detection system 100 can comprise one or more units 
for processing data to determine call provenance. The units 20 
of the detection system 100 can be programs, program 
modules, or other operative components of the detection 
system 100. These units can comprise, for example, a 
characterization unit 110, a training unit 120, and a predic-
tion unit 130. Generally, the characterization unit 110 can 
extract various characteristics of networks through which a 
call stream traversed, based on call audio; the training unit 
120 can be trained on prior call audio data and can learn one 
25 large reduction in bandwidth requirements. GSM-FR has an 
average bit rate of approximately 13 kbps. 
Many codecs have been specifically designed for VoIP 
systems. The Internet low bit-rate codec (iLBC) is extremely 
robust to packet losses and operates on a bit rate of 13.33 or more models to identify one or more codecs used to 
encode the call stream, or can learn to identify the geo-
graphical location of the source of the call stream, or can 
learn to identify the source of the call stream; the prediction 
unit 130 can use the features extracted by the characteriza-
tion unit 110 and the model learnt by the training unit 120 
to predict the codecs used to encode the call audio or to 
predict the geography of the source of the call stream or 
predict the source of the call stream. Although these units are 
described herein as being distinct components of the detec-
tion system 100, this need not be the case. The units are 
distinguished herein based on operative distinctiveness, but 
they can be implemented in various fashions. The elements 
or components making up the various units can overlap or be 
divided in a marmer other than that described herein. 
30 kbps (30 ms audio frames) and 15.20 kbps (20 ms audio 
frames). iLBC is a mandatory standard for VoIP over cable 
and is also used by Google Voice™ and Skype®. Speex is 
a variable bit-rate (VBR) codec that supports a wide range 
ofbit-rates, from 2.15 kbps to 44 kbps, and uses 20 ms audio 
35 frames. In addition to being supported on many VoIP soft 
phones, Speex is commonly used in gaming teleconferenc-
ing systems, such as Xbox Live. A large number of VoIP 
systems also use G.729 (10 ms audio frames), which 
requires very low bandwidth, as it supports a CBR of8 kbps. 
40 Skype uses G.729 as well, when making and receiving calls 
to landlines and mobile phones with SkypeOut or Skypein 
service. G.729 is also used by most Cisco hard IP phones. A 
number of VoIP phones support G.711, which is used in 
FIG. 3 illustrates a diagram of a combination of telephony 
networks, which represents the overall calling network used 45 
today. As shown in FIG. 3, there are three general classes of 
telephony networks: PSTNs 310, cellular networks 320, and 
VoIP networks 330. PSTNs 310 are generally characterized 
PSTN 310 systems. 
Because codecs may vary between two or more connected 
networks over which an audio signal is transmitted, audio 
may be re-encoded when passing between two different 
telephony networks. For instance, whereas the audio in a call 
between two PSTN users is likely to be encoded in only by lossless connections and high fidelity audio. Cellular 
networks 320 have circuit-switched cores that are similar 
across different cellular networks 310. VoIP networks 330 
share paths with other Internet-based traffic and thus virtu-
ally always experience packet loss. Various embodiments of 
the detection system 100 can determine provenance of a call 
by analyzing an audio signal of the call to identify features 
that are characteristic of these three broad types of networks 
and, further, to identify features that are characteristic of a 
specific network under one of the broad networks, over 
which the audio signal was transmitted. 
Generally, voice is encoded and decoded in each of these 
networks using a variety of codecs. Specific codecs may be 
selected for different networks based on competing goals, 
including sound quality, robustness to noise, and bandwidth 
requirements. While a large number of codecs exist, an 
exemplary embodiment of the detection system 100 can 
limit its analysis to a predetermined set of codecs. For 
example, and not limitation, an exemplary detection system 
50 G.711, bothG.711 andGSM-FRmaybeappliedtotheaudio 
for a conversation between a user of a PSTN 310 and a user 
of a cellular network 320. Encoding changes may occur in 
media gateways 350 located at the edges of telephony 
networks, so VoIP calls may traverse multiple Internet 
55 autonomous systems without necessarily being re-encoded. 
Through this infrastructure, phone calls are delivered seam-
lessly between users. To establish call provenance, various 
embodiments of the detection system 100 can detect char-
acteristics of underlying networks of a call and can thus 
60 determine a path or source of the call. 
The provenance of a call describes the characteristics of 
the source, traversed networks, or both the source and 
traversed networks. For example, provenance can be used to 
identify whether a call passed through a VoIP network 330 
65 and, if such a passing is unexpected based on the metadata, 
to alert the receiver of the change. Provenance, as detected 
by an exemplary embodiment of the detection system 100, 
US 9,516,497 B2 
7 
can distinguish between traffic that has traversed different 
telephony networks: PSTN 310, cellular 320, and VoIP 330. 
The detection system 100 can detect provenance based only 
on audio content available at the receiving end of a call. This 
approach is attractive, because provenance may be thus 
determined without access or modification to intermediate 
network elements such as gateways or routers. 
As a call traverses multiple networks, the audio of the call 
may be repeatedly re-encoded with the current network's 
corresponding codec. For example, a Skype call to a landline 
may be initially encoded using G.729 and re-encoded using 
G.711 when it encounters the VoIP-PSTN gateway 350. The 
detection system 100 can extract artifacts of each of the 
applied codecs from the received audio and can identify the 
codec based on the extracted artifacts. Based on the identi-
fied codecs, the types of networks over which the audio was 
transmitted can be identified. Identifying the codec used in 
a particular network helps characterize that network. But 
because some codecs, such as G.711, are widely used in both 
PSTN 310 and VoIP networks 330, codec detection alone 
may be insufficient to identify the types of networks used for 
a call. Accordingly, an exemplary embodiment of the detec-
tion system 100 can utilize other means of determining call 
provenance in addition to, or alternatively to, detecting 
codec artifacts. 
As an exemplary artifact, the detection system may look 
at the degradations introduced by networks into call audio. 
For example, VoIP networks 330 introduce packet losses, 
which are not seen in circuit-switched PSTN 310. Cellular 
networks 320 may introduce bit errors due to fading effects 
on radio channels. The loss of an entire packet containing 20 
ms of speech, as may occur in a VoIP network 330, is 
measurably different from a small number of incorrect bits, 
as may occur in a cellular network 320. Degradation is 
difficult, if not impossible, for a calling party to control. For 
example, and not limitation, an adversarial caller bounded 
8 
sequence numbers used in a first telephony network may be 
lost when the call is retransmitted over a second telephony 
network. The detection system 100 can identify artifacts of 
lost packets in the received audio. 
FIGS. 4A-4B illustrate graphs indicating exemplary 
packet loss in a VoIP network 330, with a packet loss rate of 
approximately 5%. FIG. 4A illustrates the amplitude of a 
two-second audio signal for a call over a VoIP network 330, 
while FIG. 4B illustrates the corresponding short-term aver-
10 age energy (STE) for the same audio signal. The detection 
system 100 can analyze the amplitude, the short-term 
energy, or both of these aspects when searching for an 
indication of packet loss. The effect of a lost packet is 
sometimes visibly identifiable by a break in the waveform. 
15 As shown, the packet loss can be more easily and more 
accurately detected when analyzing the short-term energy. 
Packet loss results in abrupt breaks in audio, which may 
or may not be detectable by a human ear. These breaks in 
audio correspond to drops in energy, which are detectable 
20 when examining the STE. The STE for a received audio 
signal y(n) may be defined as: 
25 
where En is the STE for a window of speech w(n). Specifi-
cally, w(n) is a sliding Hanmiing window oflength N, where 
30 the speech samples closer to n are weighted more heavily 
than those at the window's edge. For the codecs discussed 
herein, a packet may contain at least 10 ms of audio 
represented by 80 samples of speech. By making our win-
dow length less than 80, multiple values of En may be 
35 completely influenced by a dropped packet. This may result 
in the breaks in energy shown in FIG. 4B. The detection 
system 100 can thus detect packet loss by looking for a 
significant drop in energy, which can be followed by an 
by a lossy connection cannot spoof a lossless, dedicated 
PSTN line. Accordingly, the detection system 100 can detect 
whether degradation occurred and even the specific type of 
degradation that occurred, so as to identify the networks 40 
over which an audio signal was transmitted. 
energy floor and accompanied by a significant energy rise. 
The presence of all three of these characteristics (i.e., 
energy drop, energy floor, energy rise) may be necessary to 
detect packet loss, as each may appear individually in speech 
that has not experienced any packet loss. In FIG. 4B, a 
significant rise in energy at approximately the two-second 
To identify and characterize the different networks a call 
traversed during a call, the detection system 100 can identify 
degradations specific to each network. A VoIP network 330 
can be identified by detecting packet loss or concealed 
packet loss in the received audio. PSTN and cellular net-
works 310 and 320 can be identified and distinguished due 
45 mark may be due to the start of a speech segment. This may 
be a result of voice activity detection (VAD) in VoIP 
systems, whereby packets are only sent during active speech 
to reduce bandwidth. Analogously, when a speech segment to their different noise characteristics. Further, because the 
quality of the received audio significantly degrades with the 
number of networks traversed, the detection system 100 can 50 
also utilize quality-specific features to assist in determining 
call provenance. 
ends, there may be a significant drop in energy. 
FIG. 5 illustrates exemplary analysis of the STE of a 
fifteen-second call audio signal, encoded with G.711 and 
transmitted through a network with 5% packet loss, accord-
ing to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. In 
FIG. 5, the lower row of dots toward the bottom of the graph 
The detection system 100 can create a feature vector that 
aggregates feature values obtained from packet loss, noise, 
and quality measurements. The feature vector is referred to 
herein as the provenance information, or a provenance 
fingerprint, of a call audio. In some instances, the prov-
enance fingerprint can be unique to a particular source or 
entire path of the call audio. The feature vector can be used 
55 represents the actual packet losses, and the upper row of dots 
represents the packet losses identified by the detection 
system 100. The close correspondence between the two sets 
of dots illustrates that the detection system 100 can accu-
to train a machine learning classifier 810 (see FIG. 8) to 60 
identify the networks that a call traversed. The feature vector 
can also be used to train a classifier that can consistently 
identify and verify a call audio source. 
To provide further details on how an exemplary embodi-
ment can detect packet loss, it is noted that, within an IP 65 
network, a lost packet can be identified using the sequence 
numbers present in the metadata of each packet. These 
rately identify packet loss. 
FIGS. 6A-6B illustrate exemplary packet loss of two VoIP 
networks 330 that use different codecs. The VoIP network 
330 corresponding to FIG. 6A utilizes iLBC encoded at 30 
ms of audio per packet, and the VoIP network 330 corre-
sponding to FIG. 6B utilizes Speex encoded at 20 ms of 
audio per packet. Each time a packet loss is detected, the 
detection system 100 can also detect the length of the energy 
floor resulting from the packet loss. The detection system 
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100 can identify the specific codec used in a VoIP network 
330 based on the length of the energy floor. As shown in 
FIGS. 6A-6B, for example, the length of the energy floor is 
generally larger for iLBC than for Speex. Analogously, 
because G.729 encodes 10 ms of audio per packet, while 
G.711 encodes 20 ms per packet by default, G.729 can be 
distinguished from G.711 based on the energy floor. 
The dropping of multiple consecutive packets can result 
10 
the residual. The iLBC codec uses the residual, the synthesis 
filters, and dynamic codebook encoding to reduce the origi-
nal speech into a set of parameters that can be transmitted. 
An iLBC decoder uses these parameters to reconstruct the 
residual and the synthesis filters, which re-synthesize the 
speech when combined. When a packet is lost, the decoder 
uses the residual from the previous packet and creates a new 
pitch-synchronous residual for concealing the loss. Addi-
tionally, a random excitation is added to the new residual. in a longer energy floor than would be expected of a codec. 
For example, two consecutive dropped packets can result in 
an energy floor twice as long as expected for a particular 
codec. Two consecutive packets dropped in a network using 
G.729 (10 ms audio) may show an energy floor similar to a 
single packet dropped in a network using G.711 (20 ms 
audio). However, the probability of consecutive packets 
being dropped is lower that the probability of a single 
dropped packet, and the detection system 100 can identify 
the codec used based on the most commonly occurring 
energy floor length. 
10 The new residual and the synthesis filters from the previous 
packet are used to create speech that is be substituted for the 
lost packet. As a result, the new residual is strongly corre-
lated with the previous packet's residual. 
Given the above, to detect PLC in an audio signal, the 
15 detection system 100 can split the received audio into 
packets containing 30 ms audio each, which is the default for 
iLBC. The detection system 100 can then create a pitch-
synchronous residual from each packet and compare each 
created residual to the residual extracted from the next 
Accordingly, STE can provide a highly accurate mecha- 20 
nism useable by the detection system 100 to determine 
packet losses and, thereby, to determine a codec used to 
encode an audio signal. When a call traverses a potentially 
lossy VoIP network 330, the detection system 100 can detect 
packet loss rate and the codec used in that VoIP network 330. 25 
Some VoIP systems employ packet loss concealment 
(PLC) algorithms to prevent short speech gaps from affect-
ing call quality. Such concealment can be carried out at the 
receiver (reactive) or with the assistance of the sender 
(proactive). In reactive recovery, a lost packet is concealed, 30 
with silence or with noise, or the lost packet is replaced by 
a new packet regenerated by interpolating previously 
received packets. Proactive recovery algorithms generally 
include redundant information, such as the previous packet's 
audio, with each packet, so as to enable recovery. Proactive 35 
recovery thus generally incurs a bandwidth overhead and is 
rarely used. Because of the rarity of proactive algorithms, 
the detection system 100 can limit its consideration of 
recovery algorithms to reactive algorithms. 
When a VoIP network 330 uses a concealment mecha- 40 
packet. The detection of an association between sequential 
packets can indicate to the detection system 100 (1) that the 
audio signal is encoded with iLBC and (2) characteristics the 
specific LPC algorithm used. 
Analogously, the detection system 100 can analyze cor-
relations between packets to detect the use of other codecs, 
to detect the type ofloss concealment algorithm used, and to 
detect lost packets and characteristics of packet loss. This 
detected information can be included in the detection sys-
tem's profile for each call, which can be used to determine 
call provenance. 
Accordingly, as discussed above, the detection system 
100 can determine whether a call traversed a VoIP network 
330, determine the packet loss rate of the VoIP network 330, 
and determine the codec used in the VoIP network 330. 
Regarding call provenance, the first of the determinations 
can indicate whether a VoIP network 330 is in the path of a 
call, and the second and third determinations can character-
ize the one or more VoIP networks 330 in the call path. 
As discussed above, the detection system 100 can con-
sider PSTNs 310, cellular networks 320, VoIP networks 330, 
or a combination of these network types. Accordingly, an 
exemplary embodiment of the detection system 100 can 
detect whether a call traversed one or more PSTNs 310 and 
one or more cellular networks 320, in addition to detecting 
45 VoIP networks 330. 
nism, such as silence or noise substitution, the STE-based 
algorithm discussed above can be used by the detection 
system 100 to detect packet losses by suitably adjusting the 
energy floor to correspond to the noise floor. Most VoIP 
codecs, however, reconstruct lost packets from previous 
packets. For example, G.711 uses waveform substitution to 
repeat a portion of the previous packet. In codecs designed 
specifically for VoIP, such as iLBC and Speex, the conceal-
ment algorithm is generally more elaborate in order to 
improve robustness to high packet loss rates. The detection 50 
system 100 may be based on an assumption that conceal-
ment techniques are predominantly deterministic, and thus, 
the detection system 100 can utilize detection techniques 
that exploit the correlation between reconstructed packets 
and previous packets. 
Waveform codecs, such as G.711, are used mostly in 
PSTNs 310, as these codecs capture speech without any 
compression and require much higher bandwidth than most 
other codecs. Codecs used in PSTNs 310 tend to introduce 
noise only during speech activity, resulting in a strong 
correlation between the noise and the audio signal. This 
occurrence is known as "multiplicative noise," and its pres-
ence can be determined based on spectral statistic metrics: 
spectral level range and spectral level deviation. Further-
55 more, the spectral clarity for such a codec, or the measured 
crispness of the audio, is very high. In contrast, because 
cellular networks 320 require efficient use of bandwidth, 
cellular networks 320 generally use high compression 
For clarity, further details of the PLC algorithm in iLBC 
are provided: iLBC uses a linear predictive coding (LPC) 
algorithm to represent speech in a significantly compressed 
form. LPC of iLBC is generally based on the source filter 
model of speech production, where the larynx (i.e., the 60 
source) produces sound energy, which, when voiced, con-
sists of a fundamental frequency (i.e., pitch) and its har-
monics. The sound energy is then shaped by the vocal tract 
(i.e., the throat and mouth) into enhanced frequency bands 
known as formants, which provide speech its intonation. The 65 
LPC algorithm inverse-filters the formants from the speech 
signal to leave behind the original sound energy, known as 
codecs like GSM-FR. The spectral clarity of high-compres-
sion codecs used in cellular networks 320 suffers due to the 
significant compression. Spectral clarity quantifies the per-
ceptible difference in call quality that is experienced when 
talking on a landline versus a mobile phone. 
FIG. 7 illustrates the spectral clarity, the spectral level 
range, and deviation for 20 male and female American 
English speech samples from the Open Speech Repository, 
encoded and decoded using the five different codecs dis-
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cussed herein. As shown in FIG. 7, codecs G.711 and 
GSM-FR can be clearly differentiated and identified. 
Accordingly, the detection system 100 can identify the codec 
used based on the spectral clarity, the spectral level range, 
and the deviation of the received audio signal. After the 
codec is identified, the detection system 100 can do a 
codec-to-network translation to determine if a call traversed 
a PSTN 310 or a cellular network 320. The detection system 
can further utilize the spectral clarity, the spectral level 
range, and the deviation to provide a noise profile for a 10 
received audio signal. The noise profile can be further 
indicative of call provenance. 
Call provenance can be used (1) to identify the path 
traversal signature (i.e., the set of networks traversed) and 
(2) to provide a detailed characterization of each network in 15 
the path traversal signature. The path traversal signature can 
identify the networks that a call traversed and the codec 
used, and the characterization can provide more details of 
each network. Various features determined by analyzing the 
call audio can be stored in a corresponding feature vector, 20 
which is also referred to herein as the fingerprint for the call 
stream. As the detection system 100 makes one or more of 
the various determinations discussed above, each determi-
nation can become a part of a call's provenance fingerprint, 
as each such determination is related to how the audio data 25 
was manipulated between the source of the audio stream and 
the destination. 
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phone), re-encoded using iLBC (traversed a VoIP network 
330), and then re-encoded using G.711 (received at a land-
line) can have a "1" for three labels, GSM-FR, iLBC, and 
G.711, and a "O" for the two other labels, Speex and G.729. 
The multi-label classifier can use a set of standard reduction 
techniques to convert the multi-label data into a single-label 
model. The classifier 810 can then learn which features best 
predict the presence or absence of a label. 
For each newly received call audio, the prediction unit 
130 can perform the same procedure or a similar procedure, 
without including a predetermined label. The machine learn-
ing classifier 810 of the detection system 100 can then 
predict a set oflabels based on the learned model. In another 
exemplary embodiment the label being learnt can be a 
unique identifier for the phone producing the audio. In this 
case the machine learning classifier, 810 can use a single 
label classifier. The detection system 100 can then learn the 
identity of the source device for the call audio. The next time 
the same device makes a call, the device can be identified by 
the detection system 100. 
The detection system 100 can provide various outputs, 
depending on the situation. For example, and not limitation, 
exemplary embodiments of the detection system 100 can 
output (1) an alert if the metadata of a call is contradicted by 
the provenance fingerprint 820, (2) a risk/confidence score 
depending on how similar the provenance predicted infor-
mation is to metadata of a call, (3) an actual phone identity 
or telecommunications device identity, as identified by the 
detection system 100, or (4) other call source information. 
FIG. 8 illustrates how extracted features of an audio signal 
can be utilized to determine call provenance, according to an 
exemplary embodiment of the present invention. To obtain 
the path traversal signature, the detection system 100 can 
train a machine learning classifier 810, as shown in FIG. 8, 
preferably using a repository of speech samples. Each audio 
sample may be subjected to codec transformations and 
network degradations, depending on the networks traversed. 
For each audio sample, packet losses can be identified. If any 
packet losses are identified, the detection system 100 can 
calculate the packet loss rate, which can then form at least 
30 The metadata can include caller identification information, 
in which case the detection system 100 can acts as a caller 
identification verifier. After the detection system 100 has 
previously encountered call audio from a first caller, later 
calls from that first caller have a provenance fingerprint 820 
35 matching the provenance fingerprint 820 of previous calls 
from the first caller. Accordingly, if a new call' s metadata 
indicates that the source is first caller, but if the provenance 
fingerprint 820 of the new call does not sufficiently match 
the fingerprint 820 of previous calls from the first caller, then a part of a packet loss profile and can be added to the 
corresponding feature vector, along with information 
extracted about codecs used. The detection system 100 can 
then apply a correlation algorithm (such as that discussed 
above, using iLBC as an example) to detect packet loss 
concealment. If the correlation algorithm finds concealed 
losses, the corresponding codec can again be added to the 45 
feature vector, along with the number of concealed packets 
(PLC profile). The detection system 100 can also extract a 
noise profile for the call audio and add the spectral metrics 
40 the detection system 100 can output an alert. Contrastingly, 
if the provenance fingerprint 820 of a new call matches the 
provenance fingerprint 820 of a previous set of one or more 
calls from a known first caller, then the detection system 100 
can indicate that the new call comes from the first caller. 
to the feature vector. Because the quality of speech degrades 
with the number of networks traversed, the detection system 50 
100 can obtain call quality metrics from a single ended 
quality tool, such as P.563, and add this to the feature vector 
as well. 
In one exemplary embodiment, a risk score for a particu-
lar call is calculated as a weighted and normalized sum of 
individual risk scores for each label for which the prov-
enance predicted value is different from the claimed meta-
data value. The actual risk score is dependent on the label 
being predicted. For example, if values for a network 
traversed are predicted, and the prediction indicates that the 
call traversed a VoIP network while the metadata claims that 
it is a purely PSTN call, then such a difference could 
potentially be assigned a high risk value. The weight is based The machine learning classifier 810 can be one of many 
classifiers depending on the label being learnt. If the label 
being learnt is whether an audio sample contains the pres-
ence or absence of a codec, and if the number of codecs 
being considered is more than one, then the system can use 
55 on how statistically confident the detection system 100 is of 
its prediction. 
a multi-label classifier. The multi-label classifier can be 
trained on each sample's feature vector and label, where the 60 
label identifies actual information about each call. For 
example, and not limitation, the detection system 100 can 
consider the five commonly used narrowband codecs 
described above. Each sample would then have five labels, 
each indicating the presence or absence of one of these 65 
codecs. For example, and not limitation, a call audio sample 
that was encoded using GSM-FR (originating at a cellular 
In some instances, the detection system 100 may not have 
encountered previous calls from a first caller. In this case, the 
detection system 100 can still provide forensic information, 
such as information about types of networks traveled by the 
call. For another example, a call between the UK and 
Massachusetts, United States, is expected to use the Hiber-
nia Atlantic undersea telecommunication cable. If the train-
ing unit 120 is trained with a sample of calls that traverse this 
telecommunication cable, the training unit 120 can learn 
which features correlate with usage of this path. Thereafter, 
any new call that comes from the UK and uses this path can 
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immediately be identified in that respect. Accordingly, the 
detection system 100 can differentiate between a call that 
originated within the United States from one that originated 
from outside the United States. As described earlier, the 
detection system 100 can also provide information on the 
type of network (VoIP, PSTN or cellular) a call traversed by 
training our training unit 120 with a sample of calls that have 
traversed one or more of these networks. As a result, when 
the detection system 100 cannot identify the call source 
precisely, useful information about the call source can still 
be provided and, in some instances, enough information may 
be provided to indicate that the metadata of a new call is 
inaccurate. 
The path traversal signature and the complete provenance 
fingerprint 820 can provide a useful security framework in 
the absence of verifiable metadata. The traversal signature 
alone can be used against adversaries who are bound by 
operating constraints. For example, adversaries trying to 
spoof a dedicated line to the bank may use VoIP due to the 
fact that they can remain largely anonymous and can make 
a large number of inexpensive calls. However, the path 
traversal signatures for these two calls would differ signifi-
cantly. To address this, the adversary can switch to a 
landline, in which case the adversary would lose the ability 
to easily make a large number of calls and would potentially 
compromise his or her anonymity. The provenance finger-
print 820 can also be used against adversaries, because the 
provenance fingerprint 820 can characterize individual net-
works. Accordingly, an adversary attempting to masquerade 
as a certain caller would have to replicate the various 
characteristics of the networks between the certain caller and 
the intended recipient. 
Beneficially, various embodiments of the detection sys-
tem 100 are not dependent on a voice or accent of either call 
participant. The various mechanisms discussed above for 
analyzing call audio are generally independent of call par-
ticipant voices, including voiceprint, accent, speech pat-
terns, pitch (i.e., frequency), volume (i.e., amplitude), and 
various other voice factors. Accordingly, if a call participant 
attempts to disguise his or her voice, an exemplary embodi-
ment of the detection system 100 can still succeed in 
properly determining and matching a provenance finger-
print. 
14 
Some embodiments of the detection system 100 can be 
used as, integrated into, or otherwise in communication 
with, a caller identification device or a caller identification 
verifier. The detection system 100 can analyze each incom-
ing call and provide true caller identification information, 
based on a call provenance fingerprint 820, or provide an 
alert when the metadata of a call is contradicted by its call 
provenance fingerprint 820. 
An exemplary embodiment of the detection system 100 
10 can be used to create or enforce an exclusion list, such as a 
blacklist or a whitelist, for one or more call recipients, by 
populating one or more of exclusion lists with provenance 
fingerprints of recognized entities previously encountered 
by the detection system 100. For example, if a first call 
15 participant desires to receive calls only from a particular 
group of potential other call participants, the detection 
system 100 can verify that the call audio for a newly 
connected call matches, or is otherwise consistent with, a 
provenance fingerprint 820 of a call participant on a 
20 whitelist for the first call participant. The detection system 
100 can automatically provide a notification when a con-
nected call fails to match a call participant on the whitelist. 
Such notification can comprise, for example, automatically 
rejecting the call or automatically providing an alert to the 
25 first call participant. In contrast, a blacklist comprises a set 
of provenance fingerprints 820 for others with whom the call 
participant does not wish to communicate. The detection 
system 100 can automatically provide a notification when a 
connected call matches a call participant on the blacklist. 
30 Such notification can comprise, for example, automatically 
rejecting the call or automatically providing an alert to the 
first call participant. Further, when the first call participant 
participates in a call from a not-yet blacklisted or whitelisted 
second call participant, the detection system 100 can add the 
35 second call participant to a blacklist or whitelist at the first 
call participant's request, by detecting and recording the 
provenance fingerprint 820 of the other party to the call. A 
further benefit of the detection system 100 is that the 
detections system 100 can provide notifications regardless of 
40 whether the first call participant using the detections system 
100 is the caller or the call recipient. Accordingly, for 
example, if the first call participant places a call to a 
blacklisted individual, the detection system 100 can alert the 
call participant of the blacklist violation. 
Various services and hardware products can be provided 45 
integrating or otherwise utilizing various embodiments of 
this invention. For example, a bank or other entity may 
analyze a set of recorded past calls, creating provenance 
fingerprints for individual clients. When a bank client tries 
The detection system can also be used to create a fraud 
database, which can also be used as an exclusion list. When 
it is determined that a particular call has a fraudster as a call 
participant, then the provenance fingerprint 820 of the call 
stream originating at the fraudster can be recorded in the 
50 fraud database. The fraud database can be used as a blacklist to activate a credit card, requests a transfer, or performs 
various other financial transactions over the phone, the bank 
can use the detection system 100 to verify that the call 
originated from a legitimate client, before processing the 
transaction. The call might also be recorded, in which case 
the detection system 100 can analyze the recorded call to 55 
determine if it came from an appropriate customer. Some 
embodiments of the detection system 100 can also provide 
fraud prevention information, such as identifying that a call 
traversed over a VoIP network. Fraud prevention informa-
tion can be used in conjunction with other available infor- 60 
mation, such as the client's registered phone or other device 
being a landline, to result in alerts as needed. Banks also call 
a customer as one factor in a multifactor authentication 
system. In this case the bank can use the detection system 
100 to determine ifthe call has been forwarded to a different 65 
telecommunications device as the resulting fingerprint will 
change. 
by individuals, banks, or other entities to exclude calls from 
known fraudsters. 
As mentioned above, one or more aspects of the detection 
system 100 and related methods can be embodied, in whole 
or in part, in a computing device 900. FIG. 9 illustrates an 
example of a suitable computing device 900 that can be used 
as or can comprise a portion of the detection system 100, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present 
invention. 
Although specific components of a computing device 900 
are illustrated in FIG. 9, the depiction of these components 
in lieu of others does not limit the scope of the invention. 
Rather, various types of computing devices 900 can be used 
to implement embodiments of the detection system 100. 
Exemplary embodiments of the detection system 100 can be 
operational with numerous other general purpose or special 
purpose computing system environments or configurations. 
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Examples of well-known computing systems, environments, 
and/or configurations that can be suitable for use with the 
invention include, but are not limited to, personal comput-
ers, server computers, hand-held or laptop devices, multi-
processor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set top 
boxes, programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, 
minicomputers, mainframe computers, distributed comput-
ing environments that include any of the above systems or 
devices, and the like. 
Exemplary embodiments of the detection system 100 can 10 
be described in a general context of computer-executable 
instructions, such as one or more applications or program 
modules, stored on a computer-readable medium and 
executed by a computer processing unit. Generally, program 
modules can include routines, programs, objects, compo- 15 
nents, or data structures that perform particular tasks or 
implement particular abstract data types. Embodiments of 
the detection system 100 can also be practiced in distributed 
computing environments, where tasks are performed by 
remote processing devices that are linked through a com- 20 
munications network. 
With reference to FIG. 9, components of the computing 
device 900 can comprise, without limitation, a processing 
unit 920 and a system memory 930. A system bus 921 can 
couple various system components including the system 25 
memory 930 to the processing unit 920. The system bus 921 
can be any of several types of bus structures including a 
memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a 
local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. By way 
16 
The computing device 900 can also include other remov-
able or non-removable, volatile or nonvolatile computer 
storage media. By way of example only, FIG. 9 illustrates a 
hard disk drive 941 that can read from or write to non-
removable, nonvolatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk 
drive 951 for reading or writing to a nonvolatile magnetic 
disk 952, and an optical disk drive 955 for reading or writing 
to a nonvolatile optical disk 956, such as a CD ROM or other 
optical media. Other computer storage media that can be 
used in the exemplary operating environment can include 
magnetic tape cassettes, flash memory cards, digital versatile 
disks, digital video tape, solid state RAM, solid state ROM, 
and the like. The hard disk drive 941 can be connected to the 
system bus 921 through a non-removable memory interface 
such as interface 940, and magnetic disk drive 951 and 
optical disk drive 955 are typically connected to the system 
bus 921 by a removable memory interface, such as interface 
950. 
The drives and their associated computer storage media 
discussed above and illustrated in FIG. 9 can provide storage 
of computer readable instructions, data structures, program 
modules and other data for the computing device 900. For 
example, hard disk drive 941 is illustrated as storing an 
operating system 944, application programs 945, other pro-
gram modules 946, and program data 947. These compo-
nents can either be the same as or different from operating 
system 934, application programs 935, other program mod-
ules 936, and program data 937. 
A web browser application program 935, or web client, 
can be stored on the hard disk drive 941 or other storage 
media. The web client 935 can request and render web 
pages, such as those written in Hypertext Markup Language 
("HTML"), in another marknp language, or in a scripting 
language. The web client 935 can be capable of executing 
of example, and not limitation, such architectures can 30 
include Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, Micro 
Charmel Architecture (MCA) bus, Enhanced ISA (EISA) 
bus, Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local 
bus, and Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus also 
known as Mezzanine bus. 
The computing device 900 can include a variety of 
computer readable media. Computer-readable media can be 
any available media that can be accessed by the computing 
device 900, including both volatile and nonvolatile, remov-
able and non-removable media. For example, and not limi- 40 
tation, computer-readable media can comprise computer 
storage media and communication media. Computer storage 
media can include, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, 
EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-
ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk 45 
storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk 
storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other 
medium which can be used to store data accessible by the 
computing device 900. For example, and not limitation, 
communication media can include wired media such as a 50 
35 client-side objects, as well as scripts within the browser 
environment. Additionally, the web client 935 can execute 
web application programs, which can be embodied in web 
pages. 
wired network or direct-wired connection, and wireless 
media such as acoustic, RF, infrared and other wireless 
media. Combinations of any of the above can also be 
included within the scope of computer readable media. 
A user of the computing device 900 can enter commands 
and information into the computing device 900 through 
input devices such as a keyboard 962 and pointing device 
961, commonly referred to as a mouse, trackball, or touch 
pad. Other input devices (not shown) can include a micro-
phone, joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, electronic 
white board, or the like. These and other input devices are 
often connected to the processing unit 920 through a user 
input interface 960 coupled to the system bus 921, but can 
be connected by other interface and bus structures, such as 
a parallel port, game port, or a universal serial bus (USB). 
A monitor 991 or other type of display device can also be 
connected to the system bus 921 via an interface, such as a 
video interface 990. In addition to the monitor, the comput-
ing device 900 can also include other peripheral output 
devices such as speakers 997 and a printer 996. These can be 
55 connected through an output peripheral interface 995. The system memory 930 can comprise computer storage 
media in the form of volatile or nonvolatile memory such as 
read only memory (ROM) 931 and random access memory 
(RAM) 932. A basic input/output system 933 (BIOS), con-
taining the basic routines that help to transfer information 
between elements within the computing device 900, such as 
during start-up, can typically be stored in the ROM 931. The 
RAM 932 typically contains data and/or program modules 
that are immediately accessible to and/or presently in opera-
tion by the processing unit 920. For example, and not 
limitation, FIG. 9 illustrates operating system 934, applica- 65 
tion programs 935, other program modules 936, and pro-
gram data 937. 
The computing device 900 can operate in a networked 
environment, being in communication with one or more 
remote computers 980 over a network. The remote computer 
980 can be a personal computer, a server, a router, a network 
60 PC, a peer device, or other common network node, and can 
include many or all of the elements described above relative 
to the computing device 900, including a memory storage 
device 981. 
When used in a LAN networking environment, the com-
puting device 900 can be connected to the LAN 971 through 
a network interface or adapter 970. When used in a WAN 
networking environment, the computing device 900 can 
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include a modem 972 or other means for establishing 
communications over the WAN 973, such as the internet. 
The modem 972, which can be internal or external, can be 
connected to the system bus 921 via the user input interface 
960 or other appropriate mechanism. In a networked envi-
ronment, program modules depicted relative to the comput-
ing device 900 can be stored in the remote memory storage 
device. For example, and not limitation, FIG. 9 illustrates 
remote application programs 985 as residing on memory 
storage device 981. It will be appreciated that the network 10 
connections shown are exemplary and other means of estab-
lishing a communications link between the computers can be 
used. 
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communications devices is likely participating in the first 
call is output for presentation to the second party. 
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the indication that a 
different communications device from the first and second 
communications devices is likely participating in the first 
call is output during the first call. 
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the indication that a 
different communications device from the first and second 
communications devices is likely participating in the first 
call comprises a risk score associated with the first call. 
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the first party and 
second party are a financial institution and a client of the 
financial institution. 
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the first call 1s 
conducted as part of an authentication scheme. 
11. The method of claim 1, wherein the first call is 
conducted to gain authorization for a financial transaction. 
12. The method of claim 1, wherein the determining of the 
As discussed above in detail, various exemplary embodi-
ments of the present invention can provide an effective 15 
means of identifying, verifying, or providing forensic infor-
mation about a call audio source, independent of metadata. 
While detection systems and methods have been disclosed in 
exemplary forms, many modifications, additions, and dele-
tions may be made without departing from the spirit and 
scope of the system, method, and their equivalents, as set 
forth in the following claims. 
20 first provenance fingerprint is based on analyzing one or 
more of a noise profile, packet loss characteristics, and 
speaker-independent artifacts associated with the call audio 
received at the first communications device during the first 
call. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method comprising: 
receiving, at a computing device, for a first call, placed 25 
from a first party at a first communications device, to an 
intended second party at an address associated with a 
second communications device, data representing call 
audio received at the first communications device dur-
ing the first call; 30 
determining, by the computing device, based on the data 
representing the call audio received at the first com-
munications device, a first provenance fingerprint 
indicative of one or more communications devices 
participating in the first call with the first communica- 35 
tions device; 
determining, by the computing device, based on the first 
provenance fingerprint, that a third communications 
device is likely participating in the first call from the 
first party at the first communications device, the third 40 
communications device being a different communica-
tions device from the first and second communication 
devices; and 
responsive to the determining that the third communica-
tions device is likely participating in the first call, 45 
outputting an indication that a different communica-
tions device from the first and second communications 
devices is likely participating in the first call. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the determining that 
the third communications device is likely participating in the 50 
first call comprises determining that the first provenance 
fingerprint does not match a previous provenance fingerprint 
associated with the second communications device. 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the previous prov-
enance fingerprint is determined based on call audio from a 55 
previous call to the address associated with the second 
communications device. 
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising determining, 
by the computing device, based on the first provenance 
fingerprint, that the second communications device is likely 60 
not participating in the first call. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the indication that a 
different communications device from the first and second 
communications devices is likely participating in the first 
call is output for presentation to the first party. 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the indication that a 
different communications device from the first and second 
65 
13. The method of claim 1, wherein the determining that 
the third communications device is likely participating in the 
first call is absent consideration of call metadata received at 
the first communications device with the first call. 
14. A method comprising: 
receiving, at a computing device, for a first call, placed 
from a first party at a first communications device, to an 
intended second party at an address associated with a 
second communications device, data representing call 
audio received at the first communications device dur-
ing the first call; 
determining, by the computing device, based on the data 
representing the call audio received at the first com-
munications device, a first provenance fingerprint 
indicative of one or more communications devices 
participating in the first call with the first communica-
tions device; 
determining, by the computing device, based on the first 
provenance fingerprint, that a third communications 
device is unlikely to be participating in the first call 
from the first party at the first communications device, 
the third communications device being a different com-
munications device from the first and second commu-
nication devices; and 
responsive to the determining that the third communica-
tions device is unlikely to be participating in the first 
call, outputting an indication that a different commu-
nications device from the first and second communi-
cations devices is unlikely to be participating in the first 
call. 
15. A method comprising: 
receiving, at a computing device, for a first call, between 
a first communications device and a second communi-
cations device, data representing call audio received at 
the first communications device during the first call, 
wherein the first call is associated with an expected 
network path between the first and second communi-
cation devices; 
determining, by the computing device, based on the data 
representing the call audio received at the first com-
munications device, a first provenance fingerprint 
indicative of one or more networks traversed by the 
first call; 
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determining, by the computing device, based on the first 
provenance fingerprint, that an unexpected network 
path is likely being traversed by the first call, the 
unexpected network path comprising a different 
sequence of networks from the expected network path; 
and 
20 
25. The method of claim 15, wherein the first party and 
second party are a financial institution and a client of the 
financial institution. 
26. The method of claim 15, wherein the first call 1s 
conducted as part of an authentication scheme. 
27. The method of claim 15, wherein the first call is 
conducted to gain authorization for a financial transaction. 
28. The method of claim 15, wherein the determining of 
responsive to the determining that the unexpected com-
munications network path is likely being traversed by 
the first call, outputting an indication that a different 
network path from the expected network path is likely 
being traversed by the first call. 
16. The method of claim 15, wherein the determining that 
the unexpected network path is likely being traversed by the 
first call comprises determining that the first provenance 
fingerprint does not match a previous provenance fingerprint 
associated with the expected network path. 
10 
first provenance fingerprint is based on analyzing one or 
more of a noise profile, packet loss characteristics, and 
speaker-independent artifacts associated with the call audio 
received at the first communications device during the first 
call. 
17. The method of claim 16, wherein the previous prov-
enance fingerprint is determined based on call audio from a 
previous call between the first communications device and 
the second communications device over the expected net-
work path. 
18. The method of claim 15, wherein the determining that 
the unexpected network path is likely being traversed by the 
first call comprises determining that a type of network not in 
the expected network path is being traversed by the first call. 
15 
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19. The method of claim 18, wherein the type of network 25 
not in the expected network path is a voice-over-IP network. 
20. The method of claim 18, wherein the type of network 
not in the expected network path is a cellular network. 
21. The method of claim 18, wherein the type of network 
not in the expected network path is a PSTN network. 
22. The method of claim 15, wherein the expected net-
work path is associated with a communications provider, 
and wherein the indication that a different network path is 
likely being traversed by the first call is output for presen-
tation to the communications provider. 
23. The method of claim 15, wherein the indication that 
a different network path is likely being traversed by the first 
call is output during the first call. 
24. The method of claim 15, wherein the indication that 
30 
35 
a different network path is likely being traversed by the first 40 
call comprises a risk score associated with the first call. 
29. The method of claim 15, wherein the determining that 
the unexpected communications network path is likely being 
traversed by the first call is absent consideration of call 
metadata received at the first communications device with 
the first call. 
30. A method comprising: 
receiving, at a computing device, for a first call, between 
a first communications device and a second communi-
cations device, data representing call audio received at 
the first communications device during the first call, 
wherein the first call is associated with an expected 
network path between the first and second communi-
cation devices; 
determining, by the computing device, based on the data 
representing the call audio received at the first com-
munications device, a first provenance fingerprint 
indicative of one or more networks traversed by the 
first call; 
determining, by the computing device, based on the first 
provenance fingerprint, that one or more networks in 
the expected network path are likely being traversed by 
the first call; and 
responsive to the determining that one or more networks 
in the expected network path are likely being traversed, 
outputting an indication that the expected network path 
is likely being traversed by the first call. 
* * * * * 
